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NUMBER 1

The Complexities of Managing Hydrologically
Connected Surface Water and Groundwater
Under the Appropriation Doctrine
Douglas L. Grant*
The management of hydrologically connected surface water and
groundwater under the appropriation doctrine is widely acknowledged to
be complicated.' The immediate cause of complexity is that surface water
and groundwater differ physically. Groundwater moves slower and more
diffusely, and its movement is less readily ascertainable. This article attempts to show, however, that the ultimate cause of complexity is deeprooted ambivalence and conflict regarding water management objectives.
The article examines appropriation doctrine water management objectives,
describes the physical complications associated with integrated management of hydrologically connected surface and underground supplies, explains how the physical complications generate tensions among the management objectives, and explores how the law has resolved these tensions
to date. A concluding section evaluates the appropriation doctrine as a
tool for dealing with the complexities of integrated management.
I. BACKGROUND

Surface water and groundwater are often hydrologically connected. 2
A stream or lake may discharge into an adjacent groundwater basin or
vice versa, depending on the relative surface water and groundwater
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
1. See, e.g., C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADM INISTRATION 148-53
41971) (Legal Study No. 6 prepared for Nat'l Water Comm'n); Trelease, Conjunctive Use of
Groundwaterand Surface Water, 27B ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1858-60 (1982); Ellis,
Water Rights: What They Are And How They Are Created, 13 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.

451, 469-74 (1967).
2. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 233 (1973) [hereinafter
WATER POLICIES]; Thompson & Fiedler, Some Problems Relating to Legal Control of use
of Ground Waters, 30 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N 1049, 1060 (1938). But cf Discussion:
Jon Kyl in WATER SCARCITY 75 (E. Engelbert & A. Scheuring eds. 1984) (most aquifers in

Arizona are not hydrologically connected to surface flows).
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levels.' If the connection is significant, the surface and underground waters
constitute one supply since the diversion and use of either might well impair the availability of the other. For that reason, water professionals have
long advocated that hydrologically connected waters be managed as a
single, integrated system.'
A logical first step toward integrated management is to unify the law
governing surface water and hydrologically connected groundwater. The
prior appropriation doctrine governs such waters in thirteen western
states.' Six of these states have a single water code for hydrologically connected surface water and groundwater.' Although the other seven states
have separate codes,7 five of them have statutes that expressly integrate
rights in connected surface and underground waters.' In the remaining
two states, the courts have upheld integrated administration of rights by
3. H. RAGHUNATH, HYDROLOGY 105 (1985).

4. See, e.g., WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 230-46 (1973); Ellis, supra note 1, at
472; Piper, Requirements of a Model WaterLaw, 51 AM. WATER WORKS ASS'N J. 1211, 1212
(1959); Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL. L. REV.
358 (1929). Another reason for integrated management, even where surface and underground
supplies are not connected, is that it may enable greater water use at less cost than if the
supplies are managed separately. See R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 367 (1979);
D. TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 364-66, 371 (2d ed. 1980).
5. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (1962 & 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102 (Supp.
1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-101, -103, -226, -229, -230 (1977 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. §§ 82a-703,
-707 (1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101, -102(14) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 533.025, .030,
534.020 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-1-1, -1-3, -3-1 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1985);
OR. Rlv. STAT. §§ 537.120, .515, .525, .535 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 46-1-1 to
-3 (1983)); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-1-1, -1-3, -3-1 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.010,
44.020, 44.035, 44.040 (1962 & Supp. 1985); WYo. STAT. §§ 41-3-101, -901, -905, -930, -936
(1977 & Cum. supp. 1986). In Arizona, California, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas, the appropriation doctrine governs surface and underground streams (in some cases, together with
the riparian doctrine); but a different doctrine governs the vast majority of groundwater,
which does not flow in well-defined underground channels but percolates more diffusely. See
3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 162-214, 332-64,
423-40, 503-35 (1977). In these states, the legal distinction between percolating water and
subterranean streams is often fuzzy. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGEST
OF STATE WATER LAWS 7 (1973) [hereinafter SUMMARY-DIGEST]; Johnson, Texas Groundwater
Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017, 1019 (1982).
6. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010 to -.270 (1962, 1982, & Cum. supp. 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1973 & Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. §§ 82a-701 to -731 (1984); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -520 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01, 61-04-01 to -25 (1985);
UTAll CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1 to -29 (1980 & Supp. 1986). The situation in Colorado is extraordinarily complicated. Separate legislation governs nontributary groundwater. See infra notes
86-93 and accompanying text. Although the Colorado legislation cited above governs both
natural streams and tributary groundwater and integrates rights in the two sources, separate
legislation for nontributary groundwater establishes a permit program for constructing wells
outside of designated groundwater basins, including wells that will withdraw groundwater
tributary to a natural stream. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-937 (1974 & Supp. 1985).
7. In these states, groundwateris governed by the following provisions:IDAHO CODE
§§ 42-226 to -240 (1977 & Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 534.010 to -.190 (1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 72-12-1 to -28 (1985 & Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.505 to -.795 (1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 46-6-1 to -31 (1983 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.44.010
to -.250 (1962 & Supp. 1986); WYO. STAT. §§ 41-3-901 to -938 (1977 & Supp. 1986).
8. IDAHO CODE § 42-237aig) (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.525(9), -.620(3) (1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-3 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.030 (1962); Wyo.
STAT. § 41-3-916 (1977 & Cum. supp. 1986).
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the state engineer.' All thirteen states, then, have a legal foundation for
integrated management of hydrologically connected surface water and
groundwater.
Despite this legal foundation, experience with integrated management
under the appropriation doctrine is limited. With perhaps only two exceptions,10 the appropriation doctrine states have not yet had to deal with
widespread, acute pressure on hydrologically connected surface and
underground supplies.I However, as more complete development of water
resources occurs in these states, integrated management will surely
become more crucial.
The central feature of the appropriation doctrine is the principle that
priority in time gives priority in right. 2 A water right has a priority date
based on when it was initiated, 3 and priority affects both the acquisition
of new rights and the exercise of existing rights. Permits for new rights
are denied if the available supply is already fully appropriated. 14 The exercise of existing rights is curtailed in inverse order of priority if drought
or seasonal fluctuation makes the supply insufficient for all, that is, junior
appropriators are shut off completely to supply fully those with more
9. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1963); Griffin v.
Westergard, 96 Nev. 627, 615 P.2d 235 (1980). For at least twenty years, administrative
practice in Nevada has protected senior stream appropriations from interference by junior
wells. Hutchins, Ground Water Legislation, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 416, 428 n.52 (1958). See
also El Paso & R.I. Ry. v. District Court, 36 N.M. 94,8 P.2d 1064 (1931) (combined adjudication of rights to interconnected surface water and ground water).
10. See WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 233 (reporting acute water supply problems
in Colorado and New Mexico).
11. The three western states with the greatest groundwater use are California, Texas,
and Nebraska. Heath, Introduction to State Summaries of Ground-Water Resources in U.S.
GEOLOGICAL

SURV., NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1984, WATER SUPPLY PAPER 2275 118-21

(1985). None of these is an appropriation doctrine state for hydrologically connected surface
water and groundwater. See supra note 5.
12. E.g., Lindsey v. McClure, 136 F.2d 65, 69 (10th Cir. 1943) (priority is the "cardinal
rule"); Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313. 315 (1891) (priority is
the "fundamental principle"); Caviness v. La Grande Irrigation Co., 60 Or. 410, 424, 119
P. 731, 736 (1911) (priority is the "fundamental principle").
13. The priority of a right initiated through a permit is the date of the permit application if water is thereafter put to beneficial use under the permit. 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note
5. at 388-89 (1971). The priority of a right initiated without a permit, if allowed by state
law, generally relates back to the date of the first significant step to make the appropriation
if water is thereafter put to beneficial use with due diligence. Id. at 383-86. For exceptions
to the general relation back rule in nonpermit cases, see id. at 347-48, 386-88.
14. Water permit statutes are discussed infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. All
appropriation doctrine states except Colorado now have a mandatory permit system for initiating water rights. Although Colorado does not require a permit to appropriate the waters
of a natural stream, the water court will not issue a "conditional decree" for a proposed water
right if the source of supply is fully appropriated. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1984). Colorado has a permit system for
the construction of wells, including wells that will withdraw groundwater tributary to a natural
stream, and no permit can issue if the proposed well will materially injure the vested water
rights of others. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (1974 & Supp. 1985). A water court can confirm a water right from a well despite the state engineer's denial of a well permit application, or failure to act on an application within a prescribed time, if the court determines that
unappropriated water is available and the well will not materially injure the vested water
rights of others. Id. §§ 37-90-137(2), -92-302(2), -305(6).
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senior priorities.'" Although integration of priorities is not the only tool
available to coordinate the management of hydrologically connected surface and underground waters,' 6 the crucial role of the priority principle
in the appropriation doctrine means that integration of priorities will7
almost inevitably be at the heart of efforts to coordinate management.
Therefore, this article focuses on the integration of priorities.
II.

APPROPRIATION

DOCTRINE WATER MANAGEMENT

OBJECTIVES

Not surprisingly, the priority principle is the key to understanding
water management objectives under the appropriation doctrine. Discovering the objectives of a legal rule can be tricky, however, because the rule's
practical effects do not necessarily reveal its objectives: effect can easily
be mistaken for intention. 8 Therefore, an effort is made here to present
authoritative sources that speak more or less explicitly about objectives.
The approach is historical, looking at the original objectives of the priority principle and tracing their evolution.
A. Greater Productive Use of Water
The appropriation doctrine began in the mid-nineteenth century as
a system in western states for assigning rights to water in surface
streams.' 9 The priority principle fostered development of the vast expanses
of arid western land by affording security of water use needed to encourage
investment in water projects." As one western court explained in an early decision:
The climate is dry. The soil is arid, and largely unproductive in
the absence of irrigation, but, when water is applied by that means,
it becomes capable of successful cultivation.... Irrigation. .. cannot be accomplished with any degree of success or permanency
without the right to divert and appropriate water of natural
21
streams for that purpose and a security afforded to that right.
15. E.g., Beecher v. Cassia Creek Irrigation Co., 66 Idaho 1, 9,154 P.2d 507, 510 (1944):
"Each junior appropriator is entitled to divert water only at such times as all prior appropriators are being supplied under their appropriations under conditions as they existed
at the time the appropriation was made."
16. See, e.g., WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 230-43 (suggesting various water management tools, including pump taxes and aquifer recharge programs).
17. Cf Discussion:Raymond L. Anderson in WATER SCARCITY 430 (E. Englebert& A.
Scheuring eds. 1984) (Rather than dramatic change in water allocation institutions, "[a] more
probable course will be for the existing institutions governing water use and ownership to
gradually loosen and evolve to provide for new uses. That is the traditional way institutions
react.").
18. A. WILDAVSKY, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: THE ART AND CRAFT OF POLICY
ANALYSIS 91 (1979).
19. C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION
SYSTEM 1-6 (1971) (Legal Study No. I prepared for the Nat'l Water Comm'n).

20. See id. at 6.
21. Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 318-19, 44 P. 845, 847 (1896). See also, A-B Cattle
Co. v. United States, 196 Colo. 539, 589 P.2d 57, 64 (1978) (Erickson, J., dissenting) ("ITIhe
appropriation doctrine was considered most conducive to the economic development of semiarid western states such as Colorado. The doctrine encouraged the expenditure of labor and
resources with the promise that a decreed appropriation would receive legal protection.');
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The courts readily extended the priority principle from streams to their
surface tributaries, such as springs and creeks. 2 One reason was that
separate treatment for tributaries would result in "ruinous and useless
expenditures of money in a race between rival claimants in the extension
of ditches towards the source of water supply .
"..."23Thus, security of
water use aided development not only by encouraging new investment
but by avoiding premature obsolescence of existing investment of scarce
labor and capital in water projects.
Economic development continues to be an important objective under
the appropriation doctrine.2 4 Modern water management statutes refer
to "economic . . . well-being,""

"maxim[um] .

.

. beneficial use of ...

of underground water resources, "27
waters,"2I "full economic development 28
"maximum economical development," ' "development... for maximum
benefit,"29 "maximum economic development,""0 and "obtaining of
economic efficiency."' However, two changes should be noted in the policy
of promoting economic development.
First, the function of security of use to help develop unappropriated
water is largely obsolete because most water is now appropriated. Security
of use, however, can still be important in helping to maximize the use of
appropriated water. For example, a study of irrigated agriculture found
that estimates of the dependable water supply during the next crop season
affect the amount of acreage irrigators decide to plant that season. 32 By
increasing the security of an irrigator's water supply, the priority principle helps to avoid underplanting. Similarly, security of use probably helps
to avoid underutilization of water that is appropriated for other uses if
those uses require periodic investment decisions.
Second, the pioneer economic development objective has evolved to
reflect growing societal interest in protecting the natural environment.
Modern water statutes and judicial decisions make it clear that pursuit
of water-related economic development must be balanced against enF. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson. 230 Kan. 224, 630 P.2d 1164, 1169 (1981) (The priority
principle "is said to reward development by giving the early appropriator the fruits of his
industry.").
22. See 2 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at 201-05 (1974).
23. Strickler v. City of Colo. Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 67, 26 P. 313, 315 (1891).
24. In fact, a modern water law scholar attributes the endurance of the appropriation
system to its capacity to promote economic development by giving security of use. C. MEYERS,
supra note 19, at 6.
25. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.010(a) (1962 & 1982).
26. COLD. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (Supp. 1985).
27. IDAHO CODE § 42-226 (Supp. 1986). IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 7 calls for "optimum

development of water resources in the public interest."
28. KAN. STAT. § 82a-711 (1984).
29. MONT. CoDE ANN. § 85-2-101(3) (1985). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(2)

iSupp. 1986).
30. OR. REV. STAT. § 536.310(2) (1985). See also id. § 536.220(1) ("increased economic

and general welfare of the people").
31. WYo. STAT. § 41-2-109a) (1985).
32. See Bredehoeft & Young, Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water for
IrrigatedAgriculture: Risk Aversion, 19 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1111 (1983).
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vironmental concerns. 3 To borrow a phrase from the National Water Commission, one might say that the early objective of economic development
has evolved into the broader objective of "greater productivity, in both
monetary and nonmonetary terms, from existing water supplies."3 As
the objective has broadened, however, it has become ambivalent. Dispute
now often arises about which of several possible ways to deal with water
supplies will lead to greater productivity in the broad sense.3"
Even within the narrower economic development aspect of greater productivity, doubts have been raised about how well the priority principle
maximizes economic development. As a governmental study once observed, "it frequently happens that a prior appropriator uses water which
might be more beneficially used by a junior appropriator, because no account is taken of the fertility of the soil of the various appropriators.' 36
In addition, the priority principle has been charged with inducing
premature development and excessive water use (by basing rights on
priority in time of use), and with ignoring the economic concepts of
marginal productivity and pooling of risk (by giving full water to senior
appropriators and none to juniors during shortage).3 7 Although these
criticisms have not significantly undermined support for the priority principle in appropriation doctrine states, the criticisms might influence solutions to presently unresolved complexities in integrating priorities to
hydrologically connected surface water and groundwater.
B. Allocative Fairness
In the frontier West, the priority principle was thought to allocate3
water fairly. Elwood Mead, a major figure in early western water law, 8
described this function:
Justice seemed to demand that when there was not water for
all, those who first used water from a stream should have the bet33. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1962 & 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-101(3) (1985);
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.170(5)(a) (1983); Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould,
674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983); Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985).
34. WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 227. A background study prepared for the Commission reported: "The people of the United States give far greater weight to environmental and aesthetic values than they did when the nation was young and less settled." C. HOWE,
C. RUSSELL, R. YOUNG & W. VAUGHN, FUTURE WATER DEMANDS 5 (1973).
35. Furthermore, Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc.,
187 Colo. 181, 191, 529 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1975) (emphasis in original), suggests that the goal
of greater productive use requires looking at how water use affects land: "The waters of
Colorado belong to the people, but so does the land. There must be a balancing effect, and
the elements of water and land must be used in harmony to the maximum feasible use of
both." Accord, R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984).
36. NATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING BD., REPORT OF SUBCOMM. ON STATE WATER LAW,
STATE WATER LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEST 81 (1943).
37. Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 131,
139-40 (1969). But cf J. HIRSHLEIFER, J. DE HAVEN, & J. MILLIMAN, WATER SUPPLY:
ECONOMIcs, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY 243 (1960) ("Another alleged disadvantage of the law
of appropriation is that it may encourage waste. This charge makes sense only to the extent
that water rights are non-transferable. Only then would a person with a fixed quota not have
incentive to consider the value of water to alternative users.").
38. Mead was the Territorial Engineer and first State Engineer of Wyoming, and later
was Commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
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ter right to continue that use, and the doctrine of priority was the
result. This doctrine grew out of the belief of the first settlers that
their claims were superior to those of later comers, and they insisted that the owner of the last ditch built should be the first
to suffer when the stream failed to supply the needs of all. The
first builders of ditches could not anticipate how many were to
follow. Unless protected by some such principle, the greater their
by the attempts of
success, the sooner they would be injured
39
others to benefit from their experience.
Mead did not explain why justice seemed to demand that the claims of
the first settlers should be superior. Perhaps the underlying philosophical
principle was that rights should be based on first occupancy,40 but there
may also have been elements of the Lockean labor theory of property acthat risk takers who pioneer developquisition,4 or a utilitarian notion
42
ment deserve to be rewarded.
Allocative fairness is still an objective under the appropriation doctrine, but fairness and the role of the priority principle in achieving it have
become more complicated. Samuel C. Wiel4 3 long ago criticized the priority principle as a pioneer doctrine best suited to sparsely settled regions.
He contended that where supplies are largely developed, the priority rule
"is inadequate because based upon too selfish a principle, opening the way
to monopoly."44 For settled regions, Wiel favored remaking the appropriation doctrine to include the riparian doctrine principles of equality among
45
users and pro rata sharing of water, arguing they were more just.
Wiel's criticism of the priority principle relates to allocative fairness.
But it downplays the being-there-first aspect of fairness and emphasizes
what might be called the antimonopoly aspect of fairness. It focuses on
the harshness of barring any new use of water by latecomers, and of shut39. E. MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 65 (1903).
40. But cf 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2-5, *14-15 (suggesting that as to water,
the right based on first occupancy lasts only during possession). For a modern defense of
the principle of first occupancy, see Epstein, Possessionas the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV.
1221 (1979).
41. See Basey v. Gallagher, 87 U.S. 670, 682 (1874) ("[He who first connected his labor
with [water on federal public lands] thus situated and open to general exploration, did in
natural justice acquire a better right to its use and enjoyment than others who had not given
such labor ....").
42. See Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz. 96, 245 P. 369, 373 (1926) ("[To permit
a junior appropriator, who, perhaps, obtains his knowledge of such body of [underground]
water by the pioneering explorations and sacrifices of the first appropriator, to lower the
water level and thereby destroy or greatly impair the latter's means of diversion, including
his pumps and water containers, does not comport with justice and equity .... ).See generally
L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS chs. 3-5 (1977) (discussing first
occupancy, the labor theory of property acquisition, and arguments from utility).
43. Wiel's treatise, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (3d ed. 1911), was long

the dominant text on western water law. See Corker, Inadequacy of the PresentLaw to Protect, Conserve And Develop GroundwaterUse, 25 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 23-1, 23-18 (1979).
44. S. WIEL, supra note 43, § 112a, 128.

45. Id. The chief difference between the riparian doctrine and the appropriation doctrine as reformed in accordance with Wiel's views is that under the latter water use would
not be limited to riparian land. Id § 314, at 339.
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ting down junior appropriators completely6during shortages to satisfy fully the demands of senior appropriators.
Wiel's idea of borrowing riparian principles to cure the monopolistic
tendencies of the appropriation doctrine has gained little acceptance."
However, courts and legislatures have widely embraced another solution.
They have decided that priority does not insulate a senior appropriator
from having to bear reasonable costs and risks to enable greater productive use of water supplies or to promote the antimonopoly aspect of
allocative fairness.
Almost universally, for example, priority in time protects a senior appropriator's means of diverting water only if the means is reasonable.,
Consequently, a senior appropriator might have to improve his original
means of diverting water, at his own expense, to accommodate a junior
appropriator's depletion of the supply. Similarly, many appropriation doctrine states allow the exchange of water, whereby a junior appropriator
may divert water to which a senior right would normally attach if the
junior provides the senior with substitute water of like quality and quantity from another source. 9 Consequently, the senior appropriator might
have to bear a risk that the water exchange plan will fail because
geohydrologic data supporting the plan are flawed, the exchange facilities
are badly constructed, or the junior appropriator negligently maintains
the facilities."
Although it is widely accepted that reasonable limits may be put on
the rights of senior appropriators, the being-there-first aspect of allocative
fairness is hardly dead. As a modern philosopher has observed: "The notion that being there first somehow justifies ownership rights is a
venerable and persistent one."'" This notion often makes it difficult to
46. Cf Ellis, supra note 1, at 464, 472 (describing a practice in New Mexico of voluntary pro rata sharing during times of shortage as "less harsh" than strict enforcement of
to ignore priorities if senior rights
priorities, but later recognizing that it is "hardly fair"
will be seriously impaired.
47. The practice in New Mexico of voluntary pro rata sharing during shortage, supra
note 46, arose in the absence of water right adjudications determining priority definitively.
Id. at 463-64. Pro rata sharing during scarcity is common among users served by a canal
company or an irrigation district. See F. TRELEASE & G. GOULD, WATER LAW 503, 518 4th
ed. 1986). But in this situation, the water delivery organization can control the total number
of users and thus prevent individual pro rata shares from becoming too small to be productive.
48. Grant, Reasonable GroundwaterPumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: The Law and UnderlyingEconomic Goals, 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 8-9 (1981). In Idaho,
domestic wells drilled before 1978 are exempt from the reasonable means of diversion requirement. Parker v. Wallentine, 103 Idaho 506, 650 P.2d 648 (1982).
49. 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at 606-14. Idaho's retreat from the water exchange
is described infra note 50.
50. At one time, Idaho allowed water exchanges despite a risk that the exchange plan
might fail. Wilder Irrigation Dist. v. Jorgensen, 64 Idaho 538, 136 P.2d 461 (1943) (risk of
failure emphasized in Justice Givens' dissent). Subsequently, the exchange statute was amended to bar any exchange without the written consent of all senior users affected. 1969 Idaho
Sess. Laws 901 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 42-105 (1977)).
51. L. BECKER, supra note 42, at 24 (1977). Trelease, New Water Legislation:Drafting
for Development, Efficient Allocation and Environmental Protection, XII LAND & WATER
L. R :v. 385, 414 (1977), argues that when a seasonal shortage of streamflow can be solved
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decide in specific situations how much cost or risk can fairly be imposed
on senior appropriators to achieve greater productive water use or avoid
monopolistic allocation of water.
C. Stability of Water Rights
In the frontier West, stability of water rights was linked to economic
development (by affording security necessary to encourage investment),
and it may also have been an aspect of allocative fairness (by preserving
an initially fair allocation). Since stability may simply have been a byproduct of these objectives, it is hard to say whether stability was an objective in its own right. However, stability of property rights seems to
be a basic societal value long reflected in different legal doctrines. For
example, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the true reason
behind the doctrine of title to property by prescription is that "man, like
a tree in the cleft of a rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings,
and when the roots have grown to a certain size, cannot be displaced
without cutting at his life." 52 It would not be surprising if the fledgling
appropriation doctrine included similar concern about stability.53
In any event, modern water cases can be found that suggest stability
is a management objective in its own right. In Colorado v. New Mexico,54
a dispute between two appropriation doctrine states over a small interstate
stream, the United States Supreme Court spoke of "society's competing
interests in increasing the stability of property rights and in putting
resources to their most efficient uses."5 Although interstate water allocation disputes are governed by the doctrine of equitable apportionment
rather than straight priorities, it is interesting that the Court decided in
favor of stabilizing senior appropriations in New Mexico against depletion of the supply by proposed upstream uses in Colorado. In Fellhauer
v. People,56 the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the need to promote
maximum water use, but also acknowledged the constitutional necessity
by building a dam to store high flows early in the year for release later during the dry season,
it is fair to impose the cost only upon junior appropriators rather than all appropriators:
From the standpoint of equity and justice, it should be remembered that
development takes place over time. The first users take cheap, easily available,
always available water. There is no shortage. When more and more uses are
made, shortages are created as demands increase to meet or exceed low flow
supply. Additional risks are created and additional costs must be met. It seems
not unfair for the government to place those risks and those costs on those
who create them.
52. Letter from O.W. Holmes to William James lApr. 1,1907), reprintedin M. LERNER,
THE MINo AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 417-18 (t953); cf Willis v. Ana Maria Sugar Co.,
23 F.2d 457, 458 (1st Cir. 1927) ("Statutes of limitation (prescription) are provisions necessary

for peace and security in property rights.").
53. See also Grant, Reasonable GroundwaterPumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine: Underlying Social Goals, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 53, 69-72 (1983) (discussing

security of investment as a value in its own right).
54. 467 U.S. 310 (1984).

55. Id. at 316.
56. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1969).
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of protecting vested rights. 7 The constitutional protection of vested rights
can be viewed as representing in part a societal policy of stability in property rights. 8
The stability objective was given an unusual twist in the later Colorado case of Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Association v.
Gould.5 9 The major streams of Colorado's San Luis Valley are the Rio
Grande and Conejos Rivers. The Conejos joins the Rio Grande shortly
before the latter flows into New Mexico. Because of the lack of decreed
rights within Colorado below the confluence, rights on the Rio Grande
had long been administered independently of rights on the Conejos. Then
more vigorous enforcement of an interstate water compact meant Colorado
would have to reduce water use in the valley to increase the Rio Grande's
flow into New Mexico. To accomplish this, the Colorado State Engineer
issued proposed rules defining the respective contributions of the Conejos and the Rio Grande above the confluence toward meeting New Mexico's water entitlement. The rules continued the independent administration of priorities on the two rivers, with the result that senior water users
on the Conejos would be shut down while more junior users on the Rio
Grande could continue to divert.
The Colorado court upheld this approach, ruling that the interstate
compact was not intended to change the longstanding practice of independent administration. One of several factors in the court's decision was the
stability of historical water uses. The court observed that the appropriation doctrine allocates water "according to chronology because such allocation has the effect of protecting historic patterns of use." 0 However, priority in time did not help appropriators on the Conejos as against more junior
appropriators on the Rio Grande:
To hold ...that the compact obligation has the effect of resorting settled water rights on both streams into a single system
of priorities based solely on dates of appropriation would reshuffle the economies of the valley according to a chronology of events
unrelated to settled expectations derived from historical patterns
6
of use and reflected in the independent priority systems. '
The court was unwilling to upset settled expectations. The problem in
Alamosa-LaJarawas unusual, having arisen from more vigorous enforcement of an interstate compact. Usually the stability objective cuts against,
57. "As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening
upon the new drama of maximum utilization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be
integrated into the law of vested rights." Id. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (emphasis in original).
58. Whether government regulation of vested property interests goes so far that it takes
the property or violates substantive due process depends on factors "such as the economic
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations,
and the character of the governmental action." Kaiser Aetna v, United States, 444 U.S. 164,
175 (1979). See also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105
S. Ct, 3108 (1985) (discussion of distinction between a taking of property and a violation
of substantive due process).
59. 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).
60. Id. at 923.
61. Id.
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not in favor of, junior appropriators. Nevertheless, if rights in hydrologically connected surface water and groundwater are integrated after a history
of separate administration, A lamosa-La Jara Water Users suggests that
stability of water rights might be 6an ambivalent objective that does not
unequivocally favor senior rights. Y
D. Compatibility of the Objectives
Historically, the priority principle served three objectives: greater
economic development, fair allocation, and stability of water rights. Under
frontier conditions, these objectives were largely harmonious. Stability
complemented greater economic development. The priority principle might
prevent a latecomer from settling in a valley where the supply was fully
claimed, but this did not violate allocative fairness for perhaps two
reasons. First, being-there-first was considered a justifiable basis for
allocating property rights. Second, the latecomer could move on to another
valley-a new frontier-and find water.
As new frontiers disappeared and available water supplies became ever
more fully appropriated, water management objectives and their interrelationship changed. Instead of harmony, the objectives of economic
development and stability of water rights increasingly clashed. Furthermore, greater economic development itself broadened into the more ambivalent goal of greater productive use of water in both monetary and
nonmonetary terms. In addition, allocative fairness developed an antimonopoly aspect which conflicts with both the being-there-first aspect
of fairness and the stability of water rights. Finally, stability might be
an ambivalent objective if a water system is overappropriated but the
junior uses have continued for years before the problem is addressed. The
difficulty of dealing with ambivalent and conflicting water management
objectives is a recurring theme in the next section.
III.

COMPLICATIONS IN INTEGRATING PRIORITIES

Typically, the integration of priorities means limiting groundwater
use for the benefit of surface water appropriators because surface water
generally was developed before groundwater." The physical complications
of integrating priorities often have parallels in the administration of solely surface water priorities. The complications are just more frequent and
dramatic when groundwater is involved. Since experience in applying the
priority principle to groundwater is limited, the discussion below often
draws upon analogies from the longer and more developed history of administering priorities to surface water.
62. Cf J. SAX & R. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 837 n.3 (1986)
("There is no a priori reason to follow strict priority in a dispute between a groundwater
appropriator and a surface water appropriator when the two sets of priorities have been independently maintained by the state.").
63. See Thompson & Fiedler, supra note 2, at 1057.
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A. Delayed Impact of JuniorDiversions
When water is diverted from a surface stream, the flow is directly
reduced, and the reduction is soon felt by downstream users unless the
distances involved are great. When water is withdrawn from an aquifer,
however, the impact elsewhere in the basin or on a hydrologically connected stream is typically much slower. If a well withdraws groundwater
that is tributary to a surface stream, the stream will be depleted gradually, and the full impact might not be felt for weeks, months, years, or even
decades. Conversely, if the well is closed after a period of operation, the
stream depletion does not terminate immediately but may continue,
gradually diminishing, for weeks, months, years, or decades.6 ' Delayed
impact complicates the administration of priorities in several respects.
1. Timing of Closure of JuniorAppropriators.The priority principle
is supplemented by rules that (1) a junior appropriator may divert excess
water in the source of supply beyond that appropriated by holders of senior
rights, and (2) a junior appropriator may also divert water to which senior
rights would otherwise attach when the senior appropriators do not need
the water.6" These rules originated long ago to regulate the rights of successive appropriators from surface streams, and in that setting they usually enabled greater productive use of water without prejudice to senior
rights. If a junior appropriator took excess water or took water when a
senior did not need it, and later the streamflow decreased or the senior
needed water, the junior could be shut down. Typically, the supply to the
senior would increase promptly.
With extension of the appropriation doctrine to groundwater, these
rules must now operate in situations where delayed impact is common.
If a significant time will elapse between closure of a junior well and a
resulting increase in the senior appropriator's supply, certain variables
may intervene to increase the water available to the senior or to reduce
the senior's need for water. In other words, an anticipated need for water
by the senior appropriator might not materialize.
This problem is best illustrated, ironically, by a case involving com-6
peting surface water appropriators. In State ex rel. Cary v. Cochran,
senior appropriators had the right to divert 162 cubic feet per second from
the Platte River in Nebraska through the Kearney canal. The junior appropriators were situated many miles upstream on that river and its
tributaries. The water moved at the rate of about twenty-five miles per
day, and the distance from the state line to the Kearney canal downstream
was so great that the resulting time lag was about ten days. Because of
heavy stream channel losses, 700 cubic feet per second had to be left in
the river at North Platte to provide 162 cubic feet per second downstream
at the Kearney canal. The senior appropriators wanted Nebraska water
64. See City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73, 81 11963).
65. See 1 S. WIEL, supra note 43, § 302, at 314-15; J. GOULD, LAW OF WATERS § 231,
at 410-11 (1883).
66. 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W. 239 (1940).
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officials to close the upstream junior diversions in anticipation of a
downstream shortage, rather than wait until the senior users were experiencing a shortage.
The Cochran court identified several variables that might intervene
during the time lag to increase the downstream flow or to reduce the
seniors' need for water, e.g., low temperatures, rains and floods in the lower
river basin, and dilatory but ultimate compliance by other junior appropriators previously ordered to cease diverting. The court also noted
that figures on the flow of the river were only estimates based on spot
measurements. Given all these uncertainties, the court concluded that "the
use of water by a junior appropriator does not become adverse to or injure a senior appropriator until it results in a deprivation of his allotted
67
amount, or some part thereof." In other words, the downstream senior
appropriators had to bear the risk regarding changed weather conditions
and other variables that might intervene during a period of up to ten days.
greatly add to
The court added that "[tio pursue any other rule would
68
the loss by waste of the public waters of this state." The goal of greater
(minimizing loss by waste) prevailed
productive use of the water supply
9
over protecting vested rights.
In contrast to the Cochran rule, statutes in Colorado and Idaho expressly authorize the closure of a junior appropriator in anticipation of
injury to a senior appropriator. The Colorado statute directs water division engineers to order the discontinuance of any diversion that "is causing or will cause material injury" to senior appropriators." The Idaho
statute allows administrative closure of a well if the withdrawal of water
would adversely affect "the present or future use of any prior surface or
ground water right."7 1
These statutes, however, do not necessarily avoid the policy question
with which the Cochran court had to grapple, that is, conflict in the time
lag situation between the goals of greater productive use of the water supply and stability of vested rights. Surely, the statutes implicitly include
some limit on anticipating events that are too improbable. For example,
suppose the water supply is sufficient in normal water years for all surface water and groundwater appropriators. In a drought year, however,
runoff to the stream from rain and snowmelt is insufficient for the senior
surface rights. If the closure of some junior wells will add materially to
streamflow, but not for five years, is it likely a water administrator or
court would decide the wells should be closed during a normal water year
67. Id., 292 N.W. at 246 (emphasis added). Colorado reportedly followed the same rule
prior to a legislative change. Harrison & Sandstrom, The Groundwater-Surface Water Conflict and Recent Colorado Water Legislation, 43 U. COLO. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1971).
68. Id.
69. The court did not address whether the result would have been different if stream
channel losses had not been so heavy. But cf. infra text accompanying note 118 (suggesting
that the stream channel losses were not going to waste).
70. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502(2) (Supp. 1985).
71. IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1986).
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in anticipation of a drought year that might occur five years hence? What
if a drought bad enough to create a shortage occurs on average once every
decade, or every quarter century?
The Colorado statute on anticipatory closure was part of legislation
integrating the management of surface streams and tributary groundwater. The initial regulations issued to implement the legislation authorized the curtailment of junior wells to benefit senior streamflow appropriators "in time of shortage or projected shortage."" In Kuiper v.
Well Owners ConservationAss 'n,71 the anticipatory closure regulation was
challenged on the ground that by the time curtailment would produce
water for the senior appropriators, they might no longer need it because
of an intervening storm. The court, however, upheld the regulation. The
holding is perhaps implicitly limited by the court's remark that even if
a storm should eliminate the need for water by the senior appropriator
who had called for it, the water would not go to waste because the record
showed it could be picked up by other wells or used by junior surface appropriators who would otherwise be unable to obtain water.
Sometimes a water exchange might be physically available to solve
the anticipatory closure problem. Suppose that a storage reservoir can
be built upstream from senior appropriators who will not have enough
water under drought conditions, and that water can be obtained from some
other source for storage in the reservoir. Then, rather than grappling with
anticipatory shut down of the junior wells, it would be possible to let the
juniors pump and see if a drought actually occurs. If it does, water could
be timely released from the storage reservoir to supplement the supply
to the senior stream appropriators. Such an exchange plan might enable
greater productive use of water with little risk to senior rights.
A variation of the water exchange, albeit to solve a different physical
problem, was approved in Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass 'n v. Glacier
View Meadows.14 A subdivider proposed to develop wells that would tap
groundwater tributary to an overappropriated stream, and thus deplete
the streamflow by the amount of consumptive use from the wells. To counteract the depletion, the subdivider purchased reservoir water upstream
for release to meet the needs of downstream appropriators who would
otherwise be deprived of water. Thus, instead of a classic water exchange,
in which new water is added to the system from another source, the subdivider purchased existing reservoir rights for release to augment the flow
downstream. 7 Downstream appropriators objected to the plan, arguing
72. DivISION OF WATER RESOURCES, RULES

AND REGULATIONS

Rule 5 (July 14, 1969),

reprintedin Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268, 285
(1971) (Appendix A).
73. Id., 490 P.2d at 280-81.
74. 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d 288 (1976).
75. The subdivider's proposal was made under legislation authorizing the use of water
augmentation plans, which are defined as programs "to increase the supply of water available
for beneficial use... by water exchange projects, by providing substitute supplies of water,
by the development of new sources of water, or by any other means." CoLo. REv. STAT. §
37-92-103(9) (Supp. 1985).
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it might fail due to faulty geohydrologic data. However, the Colorado court
approved the plan. It reasoned that while the plan's geohydrologic analysis
was to a degree uncertain, "the uncertainty is no greater than that inherent in the administration of water rights generally and is not of great
significance.'"6
If a water exchange is physically available to solve the anticipatory
closure problem, the policy question arises of who should pay for it. There
are two main alternatives. The senior appropriators might be denied anticipatory closure of the junior wells, in which event the seniors would
have to build upstream storage (or, as in Cache LaPoudre Water Users,
purchase existing storage rights) to protect themselves. Alternatively, the
senior appropriators might be granted anticipatory closure, in which event
the juniors would have to build the upstream storage and seek approval
of a water exchange if they want water. The alternative selected will not
necessarily affect the productive use of water, but will affect allocative
fairness and the stability of water rights.
2. Selection of Junior Appropriators for Closure. Suppose several
junior wells are far from senior stream appropriations, and wells of intermediate priority are closer to the stream. The intermediate wells deplete
the streamflow sooner, but eventually the junior wells will affect both the
intermediate and the senior priorities. In time of water shortage on the
stream, which wells should be shut down?
The problem of selecting junior appropriators for closure has a long
history on surface streams. In an early case where administrative enforcement of priorities between water districts had broken down, a senior apseveral ditch
propriator on a stream sued to enforce its priority against
77
companies with junior priorities on a tributary river. The defendants
argued that other unjoined diverters from the river system were junior
to them, and closure of these more junior diverters would supply the needs
of the plaintiff. The court rejected the defense, saying in effect that the
defendants themselves would have to sue the allegedly junior third parties, thus creating a domino approach to closing down the most junior
appropriators. This holding promotes the stability of senior rights by making it less expensive to enforce priorities. A senior appropriator does not
risk dismissal for failure to78join every water user who is, or might be, junior
to the chosen defendant.
76. 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d at 296 (quoting from the trial judge's findings). See also Kelly Ranch v. Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 191 Colo. 65, 550 P.2d 297 (1976)
(companion case confirming that a Colorado augmentation plan need not introduce new water
into the system but may be based on the retirement of existing water rights).
77. Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 267, 60 P. 629
(1900).
78. In Bender v. District Court, 133 Colo. 12, 291 P.2d 684 (1955), the court purported

to adopt the same rule for suits between groundwater appropriators. However, it is not clear
the court truly comprehended the Lower Latharn Ditch rule. The defendants in Bender were
junior appropriators who objected to nonjoinder of seventy other appropriators from the
aquifer involved. All seventy were junior to the plaintiff, but only one was junior to the defen-

dants. Even though the Bender court said it was following the Lower Latham Ditch rule,
its opinion also hinted that nonjoinder of the one appropriator junior to the defendants was
only "perhaps" improper.
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In 1903, Elwood Mead described the enforcement of priorities on surface streams by water commissioners and other state administrative
officials:
In theory the last appropriator should be the first to be cut off,
but in practice it often happens that this appropriator is fifty or
one hundred miles away, while another appropriator, inferior to
the one seeking relief, is near at hand. To wait for water to come
from turning off the last appropriator might cause the loss of
crops, and in practice it is often the junior appropriator who can
be first reached whose water-supply is curtailed.7 9
Apparently, this early administrative practice was seldom challenged in
court.
In modern times, the Colorado court is in the vanguard of reviewing
the administrative enforcement of priorities in hydrologically connected
surface water and groundwater. In 1966, a Colorado water division
engineer ordered the closure of 39 of more than 1600 wells in the Arkansas Valley to satisfy senior surface priorities. In Fellhauerv. People,8 ' the
Colorado court held the administrative action invalid, principally because
the engineer's selection of wells was arbitrary and thus violated equal protection. The court said that the regulation of wells "must be under and
in compliance with reasonable rules, regulations, standards and a plan
established by the state engineer prior to the issue of the regulative
orders.""1 The state legislature responded with a statute that says: "The
state engineer may adopt rules and regulations to assist in, but not as
a prerequisite to, the performance of [water administration] duties." 2
However, the constitutionality of the statute has never been squarely
determined. 83 Since Fellhauer,the state engineer has adhered to a practice of issuing rules and regulations as the foundation for water right
administration.
The state engineer's initial post-Fellhauerregulations grouped wells
into zones based on the time between withdrawal of water and effect on
streamflow. Wells in Zone A were estimated to affect streamflow within
10 days; wells in Zone B within 10 to 30 days; and wells in Zone C within
30 to 75 days. Wells could be closed only upon written demand of a senior
surface appropriator, and no wells could be closed more than three days
per week. As the end of the irrigation season approached, wells could
resume full pumping by zone if they would not affect the river until after
the end of the irrigation season. The rules were to be effective from August
8, 1969, to October 15, 1969; but in a suit challenging their application
to the South Platte drainage, the trial court declared the rules void and
enjoined their implementation. In 1971, the Colorado Supreme Court
79. E. MEAD, supra note 39, at 166.
80. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
81. Id., 447 P.2d at 993.
82. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-501(1) (1973).
83. Hannay, Recent Developments in Colorado GroundwaterLaw, 58
810 (1981).
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upheld the then expired regulations. 8" However, the state engineer's more
recent regulations have abandoned the zone approach."5
3. Overlong Delay. The Colorado court has grappled also with whether
to apply the priority principle against a junior appropriator if the delay
between the junior diversion and adverse impact on a senior right is
lengthy. By statute, Colorado treats groundwater that is tributary to a
stream as part of the stream in enforcing priorities,88 while nontributary
groundwater is not subject to stream priorities.87 The court has concluded that groundwater should be considered tributary, and thus subject to
stream priorities, even though its withdrawal by a well will not affect a
stream for 40 years. 8 However, the court has decided groundwater should
be considered nontributary if the time lag exceeds 100 years because then
the water's tributary character is de minimis8 9 The court has expressly
left open how to treat groundwater withdrawals that will first affect a
stream in 40 to 100 years. 90
In setting the 100 year limit, the court had to interpret statutory
language stating that groundwater in an alluvial aquifer9' is considered
tributary to a stream if it "can influence the rate or direction of movement of the water in [the] natural stream." 92 Although the statute mentions no time limit, the court reasoned as follows:
84. Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
Though the regulations had expired, the court said the problem was not moot and guidance
was needed for the future.
85. For example, regulations proposed for the San Luis Valley would phase out all wells
over a five-year period regardless of distance from a stream, unless individual well owners
prove no material injury to senior rights or provide an augmentation plan to replace water
they consume. Alamosa-La Jara Water Users Protection Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 942-46
(Colo. 1983) (Appendix C). See also Shupe, Administrationof Ground WaterRights:A Darkening Cloud Over IrrigatedAgriculture, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 729, 740-44 (1985); Hannay, supra
note 83, at 810-14; Hillhouse, Integrating Ground and Surface Water Use in an Appropriation State, 20 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 691, 713-19 (1975).
86. See Water Right Administration Act of 1969, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602
(1973 & Supp. 1985).
87. The nontributary groundwater rules vary depending on whether the groundwater
is within or outside of a designated groundwater basin. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101
to 141 37 (1973 & Supp. 1985) (Ground Water Management Act); id § 37-92-203(1) (Supp.
1985) (water court jurisdiction to adjudicate rights to nontributary groundwater outside of
designated basins).
88. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329, 330-31 (1973) (groundwater held tributary
when proposed wells were about 13 miles from a river, and the groundwater was moving
toward the river at the rate of 0.3 mile per year). In District 10 Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett,
198 Colo.291, 599 P.2d 894 1979), an expert witness testified that if the groundwater was
left undisturbed, it would take 171 years to flow from the well to the stream, but the cone
of depression of the water table, which would be formed by pumping, might affect the stream
within 40 years. The court clarified Hall by saying that the proper measure of time lag is
the time within which a well will affect a stream, not the time it would take the groundwater
to flow undisturbed to the stream. Id., 599 P.2d at 896.
89. Kuiper v. Lundvall, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d 1328 (1974).
90. District 10 Water Users Ass'n v. Barnett, 198 Colo. 291, 599 P.2d 894 (1979).
91. An alluvial aquifer consists of unconsolidated sand, gravel, and other sedimentary
materials. About ninety percent of all aquifers developed for water production are alluvial.
Other types of aquifers include limestone, volcanic rock, sandstone, igneous and metamorphic rock, and clay. D. TODD.supra note 4, at 37-42.
92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-903(11) (1973).
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We cannot believe that the General Assembly was talking
about water that could not influence the rate or direction of movement of a stream for over a century. By the time the rivers are
affected by the pumping from this basin, we have little doubt but
what scientific progress will have solved many of the problems
93
caused by the failure of this water then to reach the stream.
Thus, senior appropriators from the stream (or, more accurately, their successors) must bear the risk regarding scientific progress. The court apparently deemed the risk reasonable given its optimism about scientific
progress.
Present value analysis might illuminate the court's scientific progress
rationale. For simplicity, assume an economy without inflation so that
a long term interest rate of only three percent would be appropriate." Using a three percent discount rate, each $100 of damage that stream appropriators will suffer in 100 years from pumping groundwater today has
a present value of little more than five dollars,95 an amount perhaps far
outweighed by the benefits of presently consuming the groundwater.
However, a problem with using present value reasoning to justify today's
consumption of depletable natural resources is that it raises charges of
disregarding the rights of future generations. 6 The Colorado court's optimism about scientific progress conveniently enabled it to skirt the issue
of intergenerational fairness.
Colorado has a more elaborate statutory foundation than other appropriation doctrine states for distinguishing between tributary and nontributary groundwater. Yet, in any state the issue can arise of whether
the impact of a junior groundwater diversion will be delayed so long that
it should be ignored in integrating priorities. Whether the Colorado court's
optimism about scientific progress will appeal to other courts (or legislatures) remains to be seen.
B. Attenuated Impact of JuniorDiversions
When a junior well withdraws groundwater connected with a surface
stream, the resulting depletion of the stream might be less than the consumptive use from the well. One cause of attenuated impact is an incomplete tributary connection between the groundwater and the streamflow. An aquifer might discharge water not only into a stream but through
springs or into a connecting aquifer. It might also lose water by evapo93. Kuiper, 187 Colo. 40, 529 P.2d at 1331.
94. Interest rates reflect not only the time value of money but inflation, the risk of
nonpayment, and income taxes if the interest income is taxable. After factoring out inflation and income taxes, the real rate of interest over the long run in the United States is 2.5%
to 3%. A. RANDALL, RESOURCE ECONOMics: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 210-12 (1981).
95. At a discount rate equal to 3% interest compounded annually, the present value
of $100.00 to be received in 100 years is $5.20.
96. See A. RANDALL, supra note 94, at 220, 241-42 (1981); T. PAGE, CONSERVATION AND
ECONOMIC EFF1CIENCY 9-12, 149-70 (1977).
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transpiration if the water table is near enough to the surface.97 Consequently, part of the groundwater withdrawn by a well and consumed on the
surface might never have reached the stream even if left in the aquifer.
Another cause of attenuated impact is delayed impact. Suppose a
junior well is operated only for the three peak months of the irrigation
season, and the total consumptive use of water is 300 acre feet. Suppose
further that the well's impact on the stream is delayed and spread evenly
throughout the year, so that only 75 acre feet are depleted during those
three months. If the stream is fully appropriated only during the three
peak months of the irrigation season, the depletion that counts is only
75 acre feet rather than 300 acre feet. Attenuated impact from junior
groundwater withdrawals raises two legal issues.
1. InconsequentialImpact. The first issue is whether the priority principle should be applied against a junior appropriator who is depriving a
senior appropriator of only a small quantity of water. This issue has often
been litigated between competing appropriators on surface streams. The
well-established rule is that a senior appropriator can close an existing
junior diversion only if it materially interferes with the senior's right.99
The material interference rule might affect not only the relationship
of existing appropriators but also water permit applications. Permit
statutes typically allow a permit to issue only if the proposed right will
not impair existing rights. Some statutes expressly use a standard of
material interference.' 0 Some others are almost as explicit; they say that
a permit cannot issue if any existing right will be "unduly affected."10 1
Many permit statutes, however, simply say a proposed use must not impair or adversely affect senior rights, without using any qualifying words
like "substantially" or "unduly."102 Nevertheless, the material interference
rule is so firmly a part of the appropriation doctrine tradition that it could
easily be read into these latter permit statutes. 10 3
97. See Crosby, A Layman's Guide to GroundwaterHydrology, in C.

CORKER,

supra

note 1, at 60-64; W. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVALUATION 377-78 (1970).
98. Of course, the priority principle may come into play if a new well taps an aquifer
that discharges into a fully appropriated spring or connecting aquifer.
99. See W. HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST
335 (1942); C. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 801

(2d ed. 1912). Colorado has codified the material interference rule. CoLo. REV. STAT. §
37-92-502(2) (Supp. 1985) prohibits division engineers from ordering the discontinuance of
any junior diversion unless the diversion is causing or will cause material injury to senior
priorities.
100. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(2) (1973) (A permit to construct a well outside
the boundaries of a designated ground water basin, including a well that taps groundwater
tributary to a surface stream, cannot issue if the well will "materially injure" the vested
rights of others.); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.620 (1985) (A permit to appropriate groundwater
cannot issue if the proposed well will cause "undue interference" with prior wells or will "impair
or substantially interfere with" prior surface appropriations.).
101. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a) (1962 & 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06 (1985).
102. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-31 1l)1(b) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (Supp.
1986).
103. Semantically, there may be more than one way to read in a requirement that the
injury be material. This is illustrated by the interpretation of a New Mexico statute that
prohibits an appropriator from changing the location of his well if the change would "im-
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Whether interference with a senior right is material depends on the
facts. 04 Although no numerical test has emerged, two recent Colorado
0
a well
cases are interesting for their numbers. In Danielson v. Jones,l'
from an
minute
per
gallons
12.5
additional
an
to
pump
owner sought
aquifer connected with an already overappropriated stream system. The
court ruled that the new pumping would materially interfere with senior
rights, noting that with continuous pumping the depletion would total
20 acre feet per year. Giffen v. City & County of Denver'0 6 is noteworthy,
not for what the court decided, but for its report of a ruling by the state
engineer that a new groundwater withdrawal of 2 acre feet per year would
materially injure senior appropriators.
An important factor affecting the materiality of injury to a senior appropriator is the value of the water to the senior.'07 As water becomes more
valuable, ever smaller impact on senior rights should constitute material
injury. However, a new administrative rule in Idaho for water permit applications suggests another factor which cuts the other way. The rule says
a new appropriation will be deemed to injure a senior water right only
if the senior appropriator "will be forced to an unreasonable effort or expense to divert his existing water right," or will receive water of unusable
quality that "cannot be restored to usable quality without unreasonable
effort or expense."108 The rule is based on the view that time priority does
not protect a senior appropriator from having to bear reasonable costs
to enable greater productive use of the water supply or achieve fairer (less
monopolistic) allocation of the water. 09 The Idaho rule, however, does not
go as far as it might have. As proposed, but not adopted, the rule also
said that a new appropriation would not be deemed to injure a senior user
pair" existing rights. In Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962), the court held
that under the statute any impairment bars a change in location; the impairment need not
be substantial. In Roswell v. Berry, 80 N.M. 110, 452 P.2d 179, 185 (1969), however, the
court upheld a decision by the state engineer to allow relocation of a well that would lower
the water level in a protestant's wells by 0.16 feet, resulting in what the state engineer called
a "negligible effect" on the water quality in those wells. The court said: "A 'negligible effect' is an effect of such little consequence that it should be disregarded." Id. Thus, in Berry
a de minimis threshold of impairment was read into the statute, even though Heine made
it necessary semantically in Berry to talk about negligible effect rather than insubstantial
effect.
104. 5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 410.2. 129-33 (R. Clark ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978);
W. HUTCHINS, supra note 99. The Colorado material injury statute, CoLo. REV. STAT. §
37-92-502(2) (Supp. 1985), also says: "The materiality of injury depends on all factors which
will determine in each case the amount of water such discontinuance will make available
to such senior priorities at the time and place of their need."
105. 698 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1985).
106. 690 P.2d 1244, 1246 n.3 (Colo. 1984). The unsuccessful permit applicant later proposed a water augmentation plan under which he hoped to divert 0.20 acre feet of groundwater per year and consumptively use 0.08 acre feet. The court noted, without comment,
that his proposal apparently assumed that taking even this amount would constitute material
injury unless the water was replaced by the augmentation plan.
107. See Model Land & Irrigation Co. v. Hoehne Ditch Co., 70 Colo. 484, 202 P. 712,
713 (1921) (junior diversion of 0.45 cubic feet per second was material because that amount
of water had "substantial value").
108. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE
AND REGULATIONS Rule 5,1,1 (Apr. 8, 1986).

OF IDAHO, WATER APPROPRIATION RULES

109. Supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
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if the senior could continue to produce at the same level from the lands
or facilities relying on the water right by reasonable modification of his
method of applying the water or using the facilities.' 0
2. Incommensurate Impact. Even if the impact of a junior diversion
on a senior right is not inconsequential, the difference between the amount
of water the junior diverts and the amount the senior thereby loses still
might be incommensurate. The legal issue that arises is whether incommensurate impact justifies not invoking the priority principle against the
junior appropriator. This issue, too, has been litigated by competing appropriators from surface streams. The prevailing rule is that notwithstanding incommensurate impact, a senior priority can be enforced against a
junior appropriator if enforcement makes water available to the senior
appropriator in usable quantities."' Wyoming, however, has a statute that
departs from the usable quantities rule. If the state engineer finds that
reducing junior withdrawals in groundwater control areas "will not result
in proportionate benefits to senior appropriators, he may require and
specify a system of rotation of use of underground water.'"' Also, under
the previously discussed Colorado administrative regulations grouping
wells into zones based on time lag," 3 a well was not deemed to affect
streamflow unless it would deplete the stream equal to five percent of the
consumptive use of water appropriated by the well. In a sense, the five
percent threshold was a rough gauge of incommensurate impact.
A delayed impact case discussed earlier, State ex rel. Cary v.
Cochran, '" also presented an issue of incommensurate impact. In that case,
700 cubic feet per second had to be left in the river far upstream to provide 162 cubic feet per second at the Kearney canal for diversion by senior
appropriators. The court applied the standard usable quantities rule. It
reasoned that to allow state water administration officers "the right to
say whether prospective losses would or would not justify the delivery
of usable quantities of water would clothe such officers with a discretion
incompatible with the vested interests of the [senior appropriators] and
destroy the very purpose of the doctrine of appropriation. "I" In another
case with heavy in transit loss of water from a stream that flowed from
Montana into Wyoming, a federal court reasoned that allowing numerous
upstream junior appropriators to take water to the detriment of two senior
appropriators downstream would benefit more people, "but equity does
not consist in taking the property of a few for the benefit of the many,
even though the general average of benefits would be greater.' 16
110. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF
(Spec. Water Allocation Rules Ed. II Dec. 1985).

IDAHO, CURRENTS

Proposed Rule 5,1,1

111. See 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at 579-81 (1971).
112. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-915(a)(iv) (1977).
113. Supra text accompanying note 84.
114. 138 Neb. 163, 292 N.W_ 239, 247 (1940). See also supra text accompanying notes
66-67.
115. Id., 292 N.W. at 247.
116. Morris v. Bean, 146 F. 423, 436 (D. Mont. 1906), aff'd, 159 F. 651 (9th Cir. 1908),
aff'd. 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
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These passages emphasize the stability of water rights and the beingthere-first aspect of allocative fairness. The usable quantities rule prefers
these objectives over greater productive water use (except insofar as
stability promotes investment in water use). However, two possible
moderating factors need to be noted. First, in Cochran the senior appropriators were not allowed anticipatory closure of the junior appropriators. 7 If anticipatory closure is denied, the delay in invoking priority will soften any antiproductive effect the usable quantities rule would
have. Second, much of the water supposedly "lost" in transit on the way
to senior appropriators might reappear elsewhere and be available for productive use by others. For example, a commentator has suggested that
the large water losses from the stream in Cochran "feed the alluvial aquifer
underlying a vast sea of corn and alfalfa that stretches along the valley,
irrigated by thousands of wells."""
C. Groundwaterin Storage
The volume of water in most aquifers far exceeds the annual
recharge," 9 representing a long accumulation of inflow. 2 ° Water usually
moves slowly through an aquifer and ultimately may be discharged by
natural forces.' In a sense, such slowly moving water is in storage."
Individual molecules of groundwater may move into and out of the aquifer.
However, the slowness of movement means a large accumulation always
remains unless wells extract groundwater in excess of the net recharge,
i.e., in excess of the recharge to the aquifer minus the natural discharge
by evapotranspiration and seepage into streams, lakes, springs or adjacent aquifers.
Since the priority principle operates only when the water supply falls
short of the demand, it is essential to determine the supply. This is easy
with a surface stream. The diversions from a stream during a year cannot exceed the amount of water flowing in the stream that year (except
for the release of carryover storage in surface reservoirs). With a groundwater basin containing significant storage, however, there is no simple
physical limit on withdrawals during a given year. The available supply
can be determined only by deciding whether to deplete the storage." 3
Uncontrolled depletion of storage would impair the stability of water
rights and ignore the being-there-first aspect of allocative fairness, without
necessarily helping to maximize the productive use of water. Not surpris117. Supra text accompanying note 67.
118. Trelease, The Model Water Code, the Wise Administrator and the Goddam
Bureaucrat, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 207, 227 (1974). A similar point is made about stream
systems in general in Wiel, Fifty Years of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252, 262 n.20 (1936).
119. W. WALTON, supra note 97, at 608.
120. See H. THOMAS, THE CONSERVATION OF GROUND WATER 261 (1951).
121. Crosby, supra note 97, at 60-61.
122. WATER POLICIES, supra note 2, at 231.
123. See, e.g., H. THOMAS, supra note 120, at 261; Hutchins, supra note 9, at 439; see
also Corker, supra note 43, at 23-12 to -14 (discussing policy difficulties in managing stored
water under the priority principle, regardless of whether the storage is in an aquifer or a
surface reservoir).
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ingly, no appropriation doctrine state follows that alternative. At the other
extreme, prohibiting all depletion of storage would favor stability and the
being-there-first aspect of fairness, but often at the expense of greater
productive water use and the antimonopoly aspect of allocative fairness.
It is doubtful whether any appropriation doctrine state follows that alternative. In contrast, controlled depletion can enable greater productive
water use by more people, albeit with some risk or cost to senior appropriators, but perhaps not enough to seriously impair stability or the
being-there-first aspect of fairness. Different approaches to controlled
depletion are examined below.
1. Temporary Depletion. An Idaho statute prohibits groundwater
withdrawals "at a rate beyond the reasonably anticipated average rate
of future natural recharge. ' ' 124 Similarly, statutes in several other states
limit groundwater withdrawals to the estimated average annual recharge,1 25 the average annual replenishment of supply,' 26 or the safe sustaining yield of the groundwater body.' 27 The Idaho statute was construed
in Baker v. Ore-Idaho Foods, Inc. 121 to prohibit groundwater mining, which
withdrawing ground water at rates
the court defined as "perennially
2
beyond the recharge rate."' 1
The Ore-Ida Foods decision, however, does not necessarily mean that
the Idaho statute, or the similar statutes in other states, would forbid
temporary depletion of storage. Later proceedings in the Ore-Ida Foods
controversy illustrate two differing approaches to temporary depletion.
The aquifer involved had an average annual recharge of 5500 acre feet.
In Ore-IdaFoods, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a trial court decree
that awarded water rights totaling 5500 acre feet to the four senior wells
and enjoined pumping by any other wells. The decree also referred the
administration of rights to the state water resources department, with
authority to modify the decree so long as the pumping would never exceed the average annual recharge. 30 Upon referral from the court, the
department took an innovative approach based on the premise that good
farming practice requires more irrigation water in a dry year and less in
a wet year. The department recalculated all water rights based on average
124. IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1986).

125. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-6-3.1 (1983) (greater withdrawals allowed in certain
basins by certain users).
126. NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.11016) (1983).
127. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 90.44.130, -.230 (1962).
128. 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
129. Id at 577, 513 P.2d at 629.
130. Since the Idaho Supreme Court sustained the trial court's referral of the case to
the state water agency, it did not have to examine the trial court's decree to determine whether
the decree would actually prevent mining. On that point, the decree (at least as described
in the appellate opinion) is unclear in two respects. First, was 5500 acre feet the net natural
recharge, i.e., natural recharge minus natural discharge? If the natural recharge was 5500
acre feet and wells depleted the basin by 5500 acre feet annually, then mining would occur
to whatever extent natural discharge also occurred. Second, would the entire 5500 acre feet
withdrawn by wells be consumed on the surface, or, after use, would some of it percolate
back into the basin? If some would percolate back, the pumping withdrawals could exceed
5500 acre feet without causing mining.
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annual use for the highest five consecutive years of use historically. It
then issued an order allowing the senior appropriators with rights aggregating 5500 acre feet to pump any amount of water necessary in a given
year so long as no appropriator pumped over five times his annual water
right during any consecutive five year period.
Junior appropriators disputed this order, contending that in a wet year
when senior appropriators with rights totaling 5500 acre feet do not need
their full amount of water, junior appropriators should be allowed to take
the unused portion rather than see it carried over in storage. In short,
the department interpreted the statutory prohibition of withdrawals in
excess of average natural recharge to mean that wells must not on average
withdraw more than 5500 acre feet annually, while the junior appropriators
argued it means that wells must not in any year withdraw more than, or
less than, 5500 acre feet.
The case again reached the Idaho Supreme Court but was disposed
of on a procedural ground without decision regarding the competing interpretations.' 3 1The presently significant point about the interpretations
is that both would allow temporary depletion of storage. Under the department's interpretation, storage would be depleted during dry years when
more than 5500 acre feet could be withdrawn, but would be replenished
in other years. Under the junior appropriators' interpretation, 5500 acre
feet would be withdrawn every year, but since the recharge figure is only
an annual average, storage would be depleted during any year in which
actual recharge falls below the average and would be replenished in a year
of above average recharge. Temporary depletion is avoidable only if the
withdrawals each year do not exceed the actual recharge for that yearan unlikely result since the Idaho statute measures allowable withdrawals
against the "average rate of ...recharge.' ' 32
2. Short Term But PermanentDepletion. Under certain hydrologic
conditions, productive water use might be increased by short term overdraft that permanently depletes some of the groundwater storage. The
hydrologic mechanisms have been described as follows:
When pumping from wells is started, it must be accompanied
by a drop in water level (or pressure, in the case of confined aquifers). The drop increases the opportunity for recharge from influent
streams. It reduces the area of seep lands and uneconomic losses
through consumptive use and evaporation. It provides opportunity for penetration of rain falling on the valley floors, which under
normal conditions did not happen because the groundwater levels
were too high. It also increases the opportunity for underflow into
the reservoir by increasing the gradient.'33
131. Briggs v. Golden Valley Land & Cattle Co., 97 Idaho 427, 546 P.2d 382 (1976}.
132. Supra note 124 and accompanying text.
133. Muckel, Pumping Ground Water so As to Avoid Overdraft, in U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRICULTURE, THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE

1955, H.R. Doc. No. 32, 84th Cong., 1st

Sess. 294, 295 (1955).
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In other words, partial depletion of storage over a period of several years
might increase the future sustained annual yield of a basin by increasing
natural recharge (from sources that are not fully appropriated) or by
decreasing natural discharge (to sources that are not fully appropriated).
The resulting gain in water use, however, might well be accompanied
by increased cost to senior appropriators to fill their rights caused by lower
basin water levels. Then the objectives of greater productive use of water
and allocative fairness in its antimonopoly aspect would clash with stability of water rights and the being-there-first aspect of allocative fairness.
Furthermore, lower basin water levels might damage environmental
values, and thereby bring out the vagueness of the modern productivity
objective. The question would be whether greater productivity is better
accomplished by withdrawing the groundwater and using it on the surface, or by leaving it in the ground and "using" it to avoid environmental
damage.
The Colorado court faced these difficulties in Alamosa-La Jara Water
Users Protection Association."' As noted earlier,'35 that was a suit to
review proposed rules of the state engineer to curtail water use in the San
Luis Valley to meet an interstate compact obligation regarding the flow
of the Rio Grande River from Colorado into New Mexico. The groundwater system in the valley lost considerable water by evapotranspiration
from native grasses and phreatophytes, such as cottonwood, greasewood,
and rabbitwood. When wells lowered groundwater levels below the
phreatophyte root zones, losses by evapotranspiration decreased as much
as one million acre feet a year.
Most of the senior water rights in the San Luis Valley are surface
rights, and most of the junior rights are groundwater rights. The state
engineer's proposed rules integrated tributary groundwater diversions into
the priority system for surface streams by prohibiting groundwater diversions unless individual well owners could prove that their wells would not
injure senior rights or could remedy such injury through plans to augment the streamflow. The trial court rejected this approach, finding it inconsistent with state policy requiring (1) the integrated administration
of surface water and groundwater, (2) the maximum utilization of water,
and (3) the use of reasonable means to divert water.3 6 The trial court ruled
that in some instances senior stream appropriators might properly be required to drill wells to supplement or replace their surface diversions before
being entitled to curtail junior groundwater diversions.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed that the state engineer
should have considered whether the reasonable-means-of-diversion doctrine would provide a way to maximize water use in the valley. However,
the court also noted that
134. 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983). For a case from a nonappropriation state that discusses
short term permanent depletion of an aquifer to increase future annual sustained yield, see
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1975).
135. Supra text accompanying note 59.
136. 674 P.2d at 931.
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[t]he policy of maximum utilization does not require a singleminded endeavor to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's
aquifers. [State legislation] makes clear that the objective of "maximum use" administration is "optimum use." Optimum use can
only be achieved with proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental and economic concerns. See section
37-92-102(3), C.R.S. (recognizing the need to correlate the activities
of mankind with reasonable preservation of the natural environment); Harrison & Sandstrom, supra at 14-15 (An increase of well
diversions at the expense of maintenance of a surface flow would
increase the efficiency of irrigation at the expense of other environmental and economic values.).'37
The court remanded the proposed rules to the state engineer to consider
whether senior surface appropriators should have to switch to wells before
curtailing junior rights, and also whether junior appropriators should have
to pay for the switch. Finally, the court added: "Selection among these
and other possibilities, including retention of the scheme of the proposed
rules, is a policy decision to be made by the state engineer, after consideration of all relevant factors." 3 Presumably, the relevant factors relate to
greater productive use of water (in the modern broad, but vague, sense),
allocative fairness (in both of its aspects), and stability of water rights
(with its perhaps ambivalent aspects).
Turning to other appropriation doctrine states, short term but permanent depletion of storage might be permissible even under statutes that
139
limit groundwater withdrawals to average recharge or sustained yield.
The Idaho statute, for example, limits withdrawals to "the reasonably
anticipated average rate of future natural recharge.' '140 This language
seems to imply that the past recharge rate is not determinative. Arguably,
the statute refers to a recharge rate anticipated after permanent depletion of some storage if the depletion would increase the future sustained
annual yield. This interpretation should not be foreclosed by the Ore-Ida
4
Foods statement that the Idaho statute prohibits perennial overdraft. ' '
A common meaning of "perennial" is "lasting indefinitely.' ' 42 It should
be permissible to deplete storage for a definite time, say, several years,
under a plan to increase the future sustained annual
yield of the system
43
if geohydrologic studies support such a plan.
137. Id. at 935.
138. Id.
139. Supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
140. IDAHO CODE § 42-237a(g) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
141. Supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1677 (unabr. ed. 19761 ("perennial"
- sense 3a).
143. In Ore-Ida Foods, the court rejected an argument that Idaho's reasonable pumping level statute should allow the water in the aquifer to be mined down to a reasonable
pumping level. 95 Idaho at 584, 513 P.2d at 636. But in that case, the groundwater level
was declining twenty feet per year with no evidence that the overdraft would ever result
in a greater sustained annual yield by increasing natural recharge or decreasing natural
discharge. Thus, the court did not necessarily have in mind the situation where short term
permanent depletion would increase the long term sustained annual yield.
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3. Long Term Permanent Depletion. In City of Albuquerque v.
Reynolds,'" the New Mexico State Engineer devised a plan to allow controlled long term permanent depletion of storage in a groundwater basin
hydrologically connected with the Rio Grande River. 4 ' The City sought
permits to appropriate 6000 acre feet per year from the basin through
wells situated six or seven miles from the river. The river was fully appropriated, and the wells would diminish the streamflow. Over a seventyfive year period, about half the water pumped by the wells would come
from underground storage and about half from surface flows. New Mexico has no average recharge or safe sustained yield statute, but its groundwater permit statute says a permit may not issue for any proposed appropriation that would impair existing water rights.'4 6 The state engineer
ruled that the proposed wells would impair existing surface rights. He
also ruled, however, that the permits could issue without impairment of
existing rights if the City would obtain and retire enough existing rights
to the consumptive use of surface water to offset the effects of the groundwater appropriations on the Rio Grande. The New Mexico court sustained
the ruling in its entirety.
The offsetting retirement of surface rights in City of Albuquerque is
similar to the subdivider's plan in Cache LaPoudre Water Users to release
upstream storage to counteract a downstream decrease in flow that subdivision wells would cause.'4 Such modern variations of the traditional
water exchange might enable greater productive water use without detriment to the remaining senior stream rights, except for a risk of miscalculation regarding such geohydrologic questions as the rate and pattern of
groundwater movement toward the stream, and the amount of consumptive water use by the new wells and the retired surface rights. In City
of Albuquerque, the state engineer apparently believed the risk was
reasonable.
D. Inadequate Geohydrologic Data
The administration of rights under the priority principle requires
detailed water supply data." 8 However, adequate data on groundwater
144. 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1963).
145. Another New Mexico case allowing the long term controlled depletion of groundwater storage is Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966). The court upheld
the state engineer's issuance of permits to appropriate groundwater that would result in
mining two-thirds of the water in a basin over 40 years. Senior appropriators protested the
permit applications, relying on a statute that prohibits new appropriations that will impair
existing rights. The court, however, concluded that proper application of the no impairment
rule must take into account that the basin was nonrechargeable, i.e., the basin received only
limited natural recharge from precipitation and this was about equalled by natural discharge.
The court reasoned that if the water stored in such a basin were to be put to beneficial use,
the supply had to be given a time dimension. Id., 421 P.2d at 775. Although Mathers is a
good example of controlled long term permanent depletion of storage, it seems peripheral
to the present article because the basin most likely was not significantly connected with
any surface stream.
146. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3E (1985).
147. Supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
148. C. CORKER, supra note 1, at 21-31.
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supply and movement are often lacking.'49 In one respect, this presents
a scientific problem of finding affordable ways to improve the data. Until
science provides better data, however, courts and water agencies must
cope with inadequate data. They do this with rules on the burden of
proof. 150
When data are inadequate, the burden of proof can determine the outcome of a priority principle dispute. For that reason, rules allocating the
burden of proof and specifying how much proof is required can significantly favor or disfavor particular water management objectives. For example, putting the burden on junior appropriators to prove their diversions
will not interfere with senior rights favors stability of senior rights and
disfavors possible greater productive use of the water supply from allowing the juniors to operate.
Generally in the law, however, rules on the burden of proof are not
based solely on which objectives to favor. Other factors may also affect
who has the burden. The burden may be on the person who seeks administrative or judicial intervention to change an existing situation, the person who has better access to the facts, or the person who asserts improbable facts. 5 1 In examining how these factors affect the burden of proof
under the appropriation doctrine, it is useful to distinguish between the
initiation of new water rights and the exercise of existing rights.
1. Initiationof New Rights. Water permit statutes typically prohibit
the issuance of a permit if the proposed right will impair any existing
right.' 2 Most of these statutes fail to address explicitly who has the burden
of proof or how much proof is required. The Montana statute is a notable
exception. It says a permit applicant must prove unappropriated water
is available, and the proof must be by substantial credible evidence, except in specified cases where the proof must be by clear and convincing
evidence.' 3 Arguably, some permit statutes allocate the burden by implication. For example, several statutes say a permit may issue if the water
54
agency "finds" existing rights will not be adversely affected,' and this
an agency
because
probably puts the burden of proof on the applicant
149. See W. WALTON, supra note 97, at 1, 613.
150. Another tool, used occasionally, is a moratorium on processing applications for permits to appropriate while better data is being gathered. See Dinsdale v. Young, 300 Or. 78,
706 P.2d 944 (1985) (moratorium upheld); City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F.Supp. 694 (D.N.M.
1984) (moratorium struck down under Commerce Clause because true purpose was to
discriminate against interstate commerce).
151. See J. FRIEDENTHAL & M. SINGER, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 261-62 (1985); Cleary,
Presumingand Pleading:An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 5-13 (1959).
152. Supra notes 102 and accompanying text.
153. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1985). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-2A-9
(1983) (permit may issue only if there is "reasonable probability" that unappropriated water
will be available for the proposed use).
154. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080(a) (1962 & 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(2) (1973)
(wells outside the boundaries of designated groundwater basins); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06
(1985). See also NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(3) (1983) (groundwater permit can issue only upon
an affirmative determination that unappropriated water exists).
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55
finding requires supporting evidence.' When a statute lacks even implicit
be filled by reference to general
might
void
guidance on the burden, the
burden on a permit applicant,
the
puts
that
practice
law
administrative
since the applicant is seeking administrative action to change an existing
situation. 5 ' The Idaho water agency has sought to clarify the burden of
proof issue with a regulation that says a permit applicant has both the
of persuainitial burden of coming forward with evidence and the 5burden
7
sion regarding the absence of injury to senior rights.'
Even if a water permit applicant technically has the burden of proof,
a Utah case shows that in practice the burden5 may be easily satisfied.
In Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City,' the court acknowledged
that the joint applicants for a groundwater permit had to show "reasonable
The court also
ground to believe"' 59 unappropriated water was available.
6
noted that the record was "filled with uncertainties"' ° regarding the impact of the proposed appropriation on a fully appropriated stream in the
same canyon. Still, the court upheld the state engineer's issuance of a permit. The court explained that it wanted to encourage badly needed water
development, and that a permit merely allows an applicant to hunt for
unappropriated water without adjudicating that any such water is
available. The court implicitly assumed that its hunting license view of
water permits would encourage new development without detriment to
senior rights because the priority principle would protect seniors if new
permittees should fail to find unappropriated water.
According to a National Water Commission study, the hunting license
6
view of water permits is widely accepted.' ' However, the study criticized
that view as ill-suited to groundwater. With delayed impact, a new permittee might pump for several years before it is clear no unappropriated
water was available, and then several more years will be required to cure
the interference with senior rights. This criticism focuses on the stability
of water rights, if not the being-there-first aspect of allocative fairness.
In contrast, the Little Cottonwood court emphasized greater productive
use of water. Once again, the crucial issue is how much risk or cost senior
appropriators should have to bear to encourage greater productive use
of water.

155. The evidence must come from the applicant, unless perhaps hydrologic data gathered
earlier by the agency for other purposes fortuitously establishes that the proposed appropriation could not injure senior rights.
156. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 355 (1965). An exception might be made,
at least regarding the burden of coming forward with evidence, if another participant in the
proceeding has better access to the facts.
157. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF IDAHO, supra note 108, Rule 4,4 (1986).
On certain other issues, the rule puts the burden of coming forward or even the burden of
persuasion on a person wishing to protest the application. For example, a permit application must be denied if the proposed appropriation will conflict with the local public interest,
IDAHO CODE § 42-203AI5) (Supp. 1986), and the administrative rule says a protestant has
the burden of coming forward with evidence on that issue if the protestant can reasonably
be expected to have better access to the facts.
158. 123 Utah 242, 258 P.2d 440 (1953).
159. Id., 258 P.2d at 445.

160. Id., 258 P.2d at 444.
161. SUMMARY-DIGEST, supra note 5, at 55.
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In State ex reL Tappan v. Smith, 16 the Idaho court rejected the hunting license view of water permits. The state engineer issued a critical
groundwater area order for the Raft River Basin, which meant no new
wells would be allowed. Previously, the U.S. Geological Survey had completed two reports on the basin. The first report estimated that little uncommitted water was available and recommended caution in further
development because of scanty data and time lag before overdevelopment
might be detected. The second report, based on studies five years later,
estimated that substantially more groundwater was available for diversion. Given what the state engineer considered a lack of solid information, he chose to rely on the first report and issue the critical area order.'6 1
The Idaho court upheld the state engineer's conservative approach to
groundwater development.
2. Exercise of Existing Rights. In litigation between appropriators
to enforce priorities, the cases are uneven regarding the burden of proof. 61'
The details vary from state to state, but the Idaho cases are illustrative.
Under one line of cases, a senior appropriator who seeks to enjoin a junior
groundwater diversion must prove that the junior is interfering with the
senior's water supply. 165 Under another line of cases, the junior appropriator has the burden of proving that his diversion will not interfere with
6
the senior appropriator's right.'5
Whether the Idaho cases can be reconciled depends on how broadly
or narrowly one reads them. Generally, however, the senior appropriator
had the burden of proving interference by the junior when the crucial issue
was whether any hydrologic connection existed between the sources of
supply for the two water rights. In contrast, the junior appropriator had
the burden of proof when hydrologic connection between the sources of
supply was clear (e.g., the senior was on a stream and the junior was on
a visibly connected creek), and the junior was arguing that even if he were
shut down, water would not reach the senior in usable quantities (e.g.,
because of losses in transit). In terms of the previously listed factors affecting allocation of the burden of proof, when a senior appropriator seeks
to enjoin a junior diversion, the senior-the person seeking judicial intervention to change an existing situation-must prove the water sources
for the two diversions are connected. But once hydrologic connection is
shown, it becomes probable that the junior diversion interferes with the
162. 92 Idaho 451, 444 P.2d 412 (1968).

163. Two private hydrologic studies introduced in evidence in the subsequent litigation
were more in line the second Geological Survey study. Id at 454, 444 P.2d at 415.
164. Cases from various jurisdictions are collected in 1 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 5, at
582-83 (1971) and 2 id at 203 (1974).
165. Jones v. Vanausdeln, 28 Idaho 743, 156 P. 615 (1916); Bower v. Moorman, 27 Idaho
162, 147 P. 496 (1915); Cartier v. Buck, 9 Idaho 571, 75 P. 612 (1904); see also Independent
Irrigation Co. v. Baldwin, 43 Idaho 371, 252 P. 489 (1926) (state water officials cannot enforce priorities against a junior appropriator without proof that the junior's source is tributary
to the supply of senior appropriators).
166. Martiny v. Wells, 91 Idaho 215, 419 P.2d 470 (1966); Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho
179. 397 P.2d 761 (1964); Silkey v. Tiegs, 54 Idaho 126, 28 P.2d 1037 (1934); Jackson v. Cowan,
33 Idaho 525, 196 P. 216 (1921); Neil v. Hyde, 32 Idaho 576, 186 P. 710 (1919).
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senior right if the senior's source is fully appropriated by rights prior to
the junior diversion. Then the junior appropriator- the person arguing
against probabilities-must show his particular water use somehow does
not cause interference.
Turning from litigation between appropriators to administrative enforcement of priorities, a hydrology text reports that administrative officials commonly are reluctant to invoke the priority principle against
junior groundwater users. The text explains that such officials "may have
either of two reasonable doubts: that the available facts would suffice to
sustain them against any appeal from an order for reduction, or that the
statutory procedure would in fact recapture the status of the earlier appropriations. "'167
In contrast to the common administrative practice, in 1975 the Colorado State Engineer issued proposed regulations designed to curtail
groundwater diversions in the San Luis Valley unless individual well
owners could prove their wells do not injure senior rights or could provide substitute supplies to seniors." 8 A state statute prohibits the curtailment of a junior diversion unless it materially injures senior rights.
The statute refers to "each case" and "each diversion" in specifying how
69
to apply the material injury standard. In Alamosa-LaJaraWater Users
70
Protection Association v. Gould, well owners argued the proposed
regulations were invalid because the regulations did not require materiality
of injury to be determined individually for each well. The Colorado court
rejected that challenge. The court reasoned that since the record showed
streams in the valley were overappropriated and diversions of groundwater significantly affected streamflow, "it may be presumed that each
underground diversion materially injures senior appropriators. The state
engineer, therefore, will not be required to repeat for every well curtailed
the painstaking analysis which led to the aquifer-wide determination of
material injury. ' ' ..
In Alamosa-La Jara Water Users, the court allocated the burden of
proof in accord with probabilities. Under the geohydrologic circumstances
in the San Luis Valley, the closure of any junior well probably would
benefit some senior stream appropriator. Given that probability, a junior
appropriator must prove that because of evapotranspiration losses or other
reasons, closure of his particular well would not make usable quantities
available in the stream.
IV. CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to demonstrate that (1) water management
objectives under the appropriation doctrine, though at first largely harmonious, have become conflicting and vague, and (2) tension among the
167. W. WALTON, supra note 97, at 622.
168. Supra text accompanying notes 134-38.
169. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-502(2) (Supp. 1985).
170. 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).

171. Id. at 931.
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objectives lies at the heart of the physical problems encountered when
rights to hydrologically connected surface water and groundwater are integrated under the priority principle. A prominent analyst of public policy
in diverse fields has observed: "[Tihe assumption that objectives are
known, clear, and consistent is at variance with all experience. We know
that objectives invariably may be distinguished by three outstanding
qualities: they are multiple, conflicting, and vague. They mirror, in other
words, the complexity and ambivalence of human social nature." '72 Modern
appropriation doctrine water law is no exception.
Those who criticize the priority principle as unsuited for today's water
management needs are often just dissatisfied with a particular resolution
of the tension among objectives. Usually the criticism boils down to a complaint that insufficient attention is given to greater productive water use
(as the critic defines that ambivalent concept). Greater productive use may
well deserve to be the strongly dominant objective. However, the complexity and ambivalence of human social behavior suggest that greater
productive use will not always prevail, at least not completely, over the
stability of water rights and the being-there-first aspect of allocative fairness. In the final analysis, the task of water management is one of making judgments, of striking balances.
The law in general, as distinguished from the law of water rights, often
must deal with the complexities and ambivalence of human social behavior.
It commonly does this in the following way:
In an important sense legal rules are never clear, and if a rule had
to be clear before it could be imposed, society would be impossible. The mechanism [of legal reasoning] accepts the differences of
view and ambiguities of words. It provides for the participation
of the community in resolving the ambiguity. On serious controversial questions, it makes it possible to take the first step in
the direction of what otherwise would be forbidden ends.
The
3
mechanism is indispensable to peace in the community.1
The priority principle fits this pattern. It says priority in time gives priority in right, but it does not say priority in right to what, or under what
circumstances.
The long history of regulating priorities on surface streams shows that
priority in time does not give a senior appropriator the right to avoid all
costs and risks in all circumstances. That history also defines to some
extent what costs and risks can be imposed on a senior appropriator to
promote greater productive use or less monopolistic allocation of water.
In differing circumstances, however, courts and water administrators have
sometimes favored one management objective and sometimes another.
As the priority principle increasingly is extended from surface streams
172. A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 18, at 215.
173. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1948). Levi recognizes the influence of economic and social policy on legal doctrine, but he stresses how the law grows
case by case through the process of reasoning by example. See id. at 72-73.
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to hydrologically connected groundwater-with its slower, more diffuse,
and less readily ascertainable movement-ambiguities in that principle
regarding permissible costs and risks for senior appropriators will be
highlighted. These ambiguities should enable rational examination of the
tensions among management objectives and should allow differing emphases on objectives as conditions vary and attitudes change.
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